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Transboundary and water conﬂict issues have given rise to increasing regulation of agricultural
water use. In order to develop effective policy tools to achieve water conservation, the value of irri-
gation water needs to be estimated accurately. Irrigated land is more proﬁtable than dryland because
of increased crop yields. This increased proﬁtability of irrigated land should be capitalized into the
sales price of the land. Previous papers on surface water rights have found this to be the case. Xu et
al. (1993) found that irrigation in Washington State had a positive effect on land price and Faux and
Perry (1999) found similar positive results for irrigated farmland sales in Oregon. On the other hand,
studies on irrigation dependent on groundwater have found mixed results. Some studies have found a
signiﬁcant positive effect of irrigation (Torell et al. 1990), but others ﬁnd no effect on the sale price
of agricultural parcels (Hartman and Taylor 1989, Sunderland et al. 1987). One explanation for such
results may be that in areas that have no restrictions on groundwater use, there exists the option to im-
plement irrigation in the future and thus sales prices may not be affected by existing irrigation. Petrie
and Taylor (2007) ﬁnd this to be the case in the southeastern United States. They look at differences
in land prices before and after a moratorium on water-use permits in Georgia and ﬁnd that value is
only added to the land after the moratorium is in effect.
Another issue that arises in modeling the value of irrigation is that the decision to irrigate a parcel
is not random, but is based on underlying observable and unobservable characteristics of the land
and its owners. Failure to account for sample selection may result in biased estimates when using a
standard hedonic method, as is commonly used in the literature. In this paper, we use both a standard
hedonic model and a propensity score matching model to evaluate the value of groundwater in an area
where pumping restrictions are in place.
Our study area is Chase County, Nebraska which is part of the Republican River Basin. The
county covers an area of 584,000 acres and the population is about 4,000. The majority of the land
is used for agricultural production: only six sections out of 912 do not have agricultural land (Fig-
ure 1).1 The Republican River Basin has been the source of long-term litigation between Colorado,
Kansas and Nebraska. In 2002, the Supreme Court decided that groundwater pumping by Nebraska
contributed to reduced instream ﬂows in Kansas. As a result, groundwater management districts in
Nebraska were forced to introduce a variety of restrictions, such as moratoria on new wells (intro-
duced in 1999), metering of existing ones, and volumetric pumping restrictions.
We use a geospatial database that includes arms length sales, tax assessor’s data, and hydrologic
and climatic variables of parcels that sold in Chase Country between 2000 and 2008. There are 330
observations, where each parcel contains sale prices along with the sales date obtained from the Chase
County tax assessor’s website
(http://chase.assessor.gisworkshop.com/Assessor/index.jsp). In addition, other characteristics of the
parcel, such as the presence of outbuildings and the square footage and age of residences are included.
Each observation also has the distribution of agricultural land (irrigated, dryland, or grassland) and
four soil quality types in each type of land. We also assembled georeferenced data on estimated depth
to water, the rate at which a well can pump water, precipitation and growing degree days.
1A section is one square mile, which is an area of 640 acres.
1First, we estimate an Ordinary Least Squares Regression Model to characterize the sale price per
acre of the land. Several alternative speciﬁcations are considered, including year dummies, inter-
action terms between year dummies and irrigation, and dummies between irrigation and hydrologic
variables. The main results are that (i) irrigation has a signiﬁcant and positive effect on the sale price
of land, (ii) the rate at which a well can pump water is important in determining the sale price, (iii)
depth to water does not have a signiﬁcant effect on the sale price per acre of land, and (iv) the climatic
variables considered do not have an effect. From the preferred OLS model, the value of groundwater
irrigation is found to be $712 per acre.
Second, we estimate a propensity score model which involves two steps. First, we estimate the
probability of a parcel of land being irrigated using a probit model. The results from the probit show
that farmers are more likely to irrigate on lands that are of intermediate quality, suggesting that irri-
gation is land-quality augmenting. This follows previous studies on irrigation technology adoption
(Lichtenberg 1989). However, unlike results from the OLS model, depth to water and climatic vari-
ables do affect the decision to adopt irrigation with expected signs.
In the second step, we match pairs of non-irrigated and irrigated parcels that have the same proba-
bility of being irrigated and analyze whether there is a difference in the sales price. Results show that
once again there is a positive and signiﬁcant value associated with groundwater irrigation rights, but
the difference is larger than the hedonic analysis at $839 per acre.
We ﬁnd that, controlling for selection, estimates for the value of groundwater irrigation obtained
with propensity score matching are higher than estimates obtained with the standard hedonic model.
The difference between models appears to be driven by preferential adoption of irrigation on in-
termediate quality land. Presumably, irrigation is adopted on intermediate quality land because the
difference in proﬁtability from irrigation is higher on these lands than on both high and low quality
lands. Given that irrigation technology is generally considered to be land quality augmenting, an im-
portant policy implication is that simple hedonic analysis may generally underestimate the value of
groundwater in irrigation.
This paper is laid out as follows. First, we provide some background of my study area. This
includes the relevant regulatory history of the Republican River Basin and the Upper Republican Nat-
ural Resource District in which Chase County is located. Second, we present both the Ordinary Least
Squares and Propensity Score Matching models. In the following section, we describe the economic,
physical, hydrologic, and climatic data we use in the analysis. we then present the results obtained
using both methods of estimation and compare them. Finally, we provide a conclusion with policy
implications and future research possibilities in this area.
22 Background
In this section we describe (i) previous work that has been done using hedonic analysis to estimate
the value irrigation water and (ii) the institutional background of my study area.
2.1 Previous Literature
Irrigatinglandincreasescropyieldsandthisshouldbecapitalizedintothesalepriceofagricultural
land. Irrigation can be either from surface water or groundwater sources. Surface water studies ﬁnd
that irrigation increases the sale price of land. For example, Xu et al. (1993) analyze agricultural land
sales in Washington state and ﬁnd that irrigation systems have a positive effect. Their model includes
three types of irrigation systems: center pivot, sprinkler, and rill irrigation in areas where available.
Their results show that center pivot irrigation adds most value to the sale price, followed by sprinkler
irrigation and ﬁnally rill irrigation. Faux and Perry (1999) also ﬁnd surface water irrigation to have
a positive effect on the price of farmland in Malheur County, Oregon. They stress the importance
of including separate land classes as opposed to an averaged composite index as soil class is not a
continuous variable and averaging may result in loss of information. In both Oregon and Washington
States, agricultural production is diverse. Conversely, in our study area, irrigated corn and dryland
wheat dominate production.
Studies that use hedonic analysis to estimate the value of groundwater irrigation ﬁnd mixed re-
sults. Hartman and Taylor (1989) ﬁnd that groundwater does not have a signiﬁcant effect on the sale
price of land in Colorado. Sunderland, Libbin, and Torell (1987) ﬁnd the same result in New Mexico,
when analyzing land that uses groundwater from the Ogallala aquifer. Torell et al. (1990) expanded
their previous study area from New Mexico to include Oklahoma, Nebraska, Kansas, and Colorado
(all of which use the Ogallala) to estimate the value of groundwater. They found a positive effect
of irrigation on the sale price. They suggest that the difference in results from previous studies is a
result of regional differences that were not included previously. In particular, they found that saturated
thickness of the aquifer and measures of farm income were signiﬁcant determinants in irrigated land
values. They also found declining price differentials between irrigated and non-irrigated land over
time.
Another reason that may explain these mixed results is that in general, groundwater is private
property and its use is not regulated. Without regulations in place there is the option to implement
irrigation in the future and so the potential value of irrigation may be capitalized into the price of both
currently irrigated land and dryland. Petrie and Taylor (2007) did a study that is the closest to my
analysis. They estimated the value of water in Dooly County, Georgia before and after a moratorium
on water use permits. They found that before the moratorium on water use permits there was no
difference in the prices of agricultural land with or without permits. However, after the moratorium,
land with water use permits attached sold for about 30 percent more than land without permits. Petrie
and Taylor’s (2007) interpretation was that the moratorium added value of the land with permits; an
alternative interpretation is that the moratorium reduced the value of parcels without permits. The
moratorium in our study area is different than that in Dooly County, Georgia: permits in the latter
allow unlimited pumping from a source whereas in our area there are also volumetric pumping re-
3strictions even with a permit.
To the best of our knowledge, there are no published papers using propensity score matching
(PSM) for hedonic analysis. However, several working papers use the PSM methodology in a hedo-
nic context. Cutter et al. (2009) use PSM to estimate the hedonic value of open space land and Lynch
et al. (2009) estimate the difference in land price due to preservation programs. The PSM method is
applicable to our study as we observe both parcels that are irrigated and those that are not irrigated,
and we also have data on the variables that should affect the decision to irrigate. This allows for
the estimation of propensity scores for both irrigated and non-irrigated parcels in order to match and
compare them with each other.
2.2 Institutional Background
The Republican River is formed by the merging of the North Fork Republican River and the South
Fork Republican River, both of which originate in northeastern Colorado. It ﬂows eastward for ap-
proximately 445 miles through southeast Nebraska and further south entering into the Smoky Hills
Region of Kansas where it eventually becomes the Kansas River. The Nebraska portion of the River
is known as the Republican River Basin and its watershed constitutes about 24,900 square miles. In
1943 Colorado, Nebraska and Kansas agreed to the Republican River Compact which allocated the
“virgin water supply” equitably among the three states. The “virgin water supply” is the “water sup-
ply within the Basin undepleted by the the activities of man” (Hinderlider et al. 1942). The compact
also stated that the best use of the water was “beneﬁcial consumptive use” which was deﬁned as “that
use by which the water supply of the Basin is consumed through the activities of man, and shall in-
clude water consumed by evaporation from any reservoir, canal, ditch or irrigated area” (Hinderlider
et al. 1942).
The original Compact did not include groundwater in the calculation of the “virgin water supply”.
Disputes over Nebraska’s consumptive water use in the Basin ﬁnally resulted in Kansas ﬁling an orig-
inal action against the states of Nebraska and Colorado in 1998. The United States Supreme Court
appointed a Special Master who concluded that groundwater use should be included in the calcula-
tions for the virgin water supply and the allocations for each state. On May 19, 2003 the three states
entered into a Settlement Agreement and adopted the Special Master’s recommendation, as stipulated
by the Supreme Court (Nebraska Department of Natural Resources and Upper Republican Natural
Resource District 2008).
In Nebraska, water management is undertaken by natural resource districts (NRDs). These NRDs
began operation in 1972. The four NRDs in the Republican River Basin are the Upper Republican,
Middle Republican, Tri Basin, and Lower Republican NRDs. The NRDs are bounded by the natural
boundaries of the Republican River (URNRD fact sheet, 2008). The Upper Republican NRD consists
of Perkins, Chase and Dundy counties and covers 435,337 irrigated acres.2 The goals of the URNRD
are to make sure that it is in compliance with the Republican River Compact, that users of water in the
2There are no surface water rights in the study area of Chase County and as a result, all irrigated farmland uses
groundwater irrigation only.
4URNRD are only responsible for their share in complying with the Compact, and to help to sustain
compliance through regulation and incentive programs (Nebraska Department of Natural Resources
and Upper Republican Natural Resource District 2008).
In order to comply with the Settlement Agreement, the Nebraska legislature passed LB 962 in
2004; this required NRDs that were over or fully-appropriated in their water use to develop and im-
plement integrated water management plans. One of the methods to help control use was allowing
irrigation on only certiﬁed acres. A certiﬁed acre is any acre of land that has an allocation of ground-
water for irrigation allocated to it (Nebraska Department of Natural Resources and Upper Republican
Natural Resource District 2008). The certiﬁcation process used historical and tax assessors’ rewards
to determine the extent of irrigation.
The Upper Republican River Basin has required that all ground water use be metered and the data
to be reported since 1978. From these data, the NDNR determined that the URNRD pumping volume
for the years 1998-2002 was 531,763 acre-feet. It also estimated that for the same time period the
URNRD’s depletion to stream ﬂow was 74,161 acre-feet. For the URNRD, these numbers mean a
depletion proportion of 44 percent. In 2005, the NDNR and URNRD adopted an integrated water
management plan that provided regulations starting in 2005 and running until 2007. According to this
plan, the URNRD was allowed a groundwater allocation of 13.5 inches per year per certiﬁed acre.
This plan was implemented to reduce water usage by 5 percent from the 1998-2002 baseline that
was calculated. Furthermore, the NDNR and URNRD agreed that a 20 percent reduction in pump-
ing from the 1998-2002 baseline would be enough to keep the total depletions within the 44 percent
URNRD share until 2020 (Nebraska Department of Natural Resources and Upper Republican Natural
Resource District 2008). In 2008, the URNRD further reduced the allocation to 13 acre inches per
year per certiﬁed acre.
Note that in the URNRD, if farmers did not face any restrictions on water use, it is estimated that
they would use up to 18 acre inches of water per year per irrigated acre (Palazzo 2009). Thus, the
current allocation of 13 inches per acre per year is binding on almost all farmers.
53 Model and Estimation
We use two different techniques for the estimation process. Below, we describe the theory behind
each of these models, the assumptions made, and the application to my study area.
3.1 Ordinary Least Squares
Hedonic price theory for an agricultural parcel of land is explained below. In the basic model an
individual receives utility from the consumption of a commodity X, which is a parcel of land in this
case. This commodity or parcel is composed of a vector of hydrologic and climatic characteristics, Q,
a vector of physical characteristics, S, and a vector of structural characteristics, N. An individual can
choose to purchase any parcel of land and increase their consumption of a particular characteristic by
buying a parcel that has more of that characteristic. For example, a person can choose a parcel that
receives more rain if that is the desired characteristic.
In this paper, the commodity X is a parcel of land. The vector Q contains the depth to water, pump
rate, precipitation, and beneﬁcial and harmful degree days. The vector S includes the different soil
types and N is composed of a dummy for outbuildings, house size, and age of any house on the parcel.
Mathematically, this model can be represented as:
PLi = Pi(Si;Ni;Qi) (1)
where the price of the ith parcel of land is a function of the vectors of characteristics. This function
can be linear or non linear.
To estimate the hedonic price function, we use an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression. The
dependent variable is the sale price of land per acre. Recent hedonic studies (Faux and Perry 1999, ?)
use the per acre sale price. This is because there is such a high range in the total acres of the parcels.
The independent variables included in the model are a dummy variable for irrigation, the proportions
of each soil quality type, the pump rate (gallons per minute per acre), the house size (square feet per
acre), the assessed value of outbuildings ($ per acre), depth to water (feet), precipitation, beneﬁcial
growing degree days, and harmful growing degree days. Irrigation is captured with a dummy variable
equal to one if the parcel is irrigated and zero if non-irrigated.
Soil qualities were included as better soil qualities are expected to lead to higher yields and so
higher proﬁtability. The pump rate is the rate at which a well can pump water in gallons per minute,
as reported by the Nebraska DNR wells database. The coefﬁcient on pump rate is expected to be
positive because a faster rate of pumping would allow a farmer to irrigate more land. we include the
pump rate per parcel as well as per acre. The per parcel value provides information about the decision
to irrigate an entire parcel while the pump rate per acre contains information about how much of the
parcel the farmer could to irrigate. Structures such as houses and outbuildings also add value to a
parcel of land and so positive coefﬁcients are also expected for these. The more recently a house
was built, the better condition it should be in, and so we also expect a negative effect of increasing
house age on the sales price of land. Depth to water measures the distance to the top of the aquifer.
6A lower depth would make the water more easily accessible and so a negative coefﬁcient is expected
for this variable. Beneﬁcial degree days are those that are conducive to the growing of crops and lead
to higher yields. Therefore, the coefﬁcient on this variable should be positive. On the other hand, the
coefﬁcient on harmful degree days should be negative as more harmful days will lead to lower crop
yields and lower proﬁtability. More detail on each variable is provided in the Data section.
3.2 Propensity Score Matching
The second model we use estimates the causal effect of irrigation on the sales price of a parcel
of land. Propensity score matching allows for the evaluation of an outcome on particular units (sale
price of land, in this project) based on exposure to a program or treatment. The theory is that each unit
of interest can be exposed to different levels of treatment and the focus is on a comparison of units
that are exposed and those that are not exposed to the treatment (Imbens and Wooldridge 2009). An
issue with this is that most often we do not observe different levels of the treatment on a single unit.
We only observe the unit being exposed to one level of treatment. Therefore, comparisons must be
made between distinct units that have been exposed to different levels of treatment. In the economics
literature the focus has been on endogeneity or self selection which means that items that are treated
are by deﬁnition different that those that are not.
There are two main assumptions that have to be made in order to estimate a PSM model. The
ﬁrst is the conditional independence assumption. This states that the selection into treatment is based
on observable characteristics. Therefore, selection into irrigation must be explained by observable
variables in the model. The variables that explain selection in this model are soil type, pump rate,
depth to water, precipitation and growing degree days. The second is the common support assump-
tion. Having common support means that the treated and untreated groups must have an overlap of
propensity scores in order to match them for comparison. Probabilities of the irrigated parcels must
overlap probabilities for the non-irrigated parcels.
Propensity score matching is a two-step process. In the ﬁrst step, a probit regression model is
estimated. It estimates the probabilities of the treated and non treated variables. For this paper, it
measures the probability that a parcel of land will be irrigated. The dependent variable is a dummy
variable that is equal to one if the parcel is irrigated and zero if not irrigated. The independent vari-
ables includes in the model are the proportions of soil types, the pump rate (in gallons per minute
per acre and in gallons per minute), depth to water (feet), precipitation, beneﬁcial degree days and
harmful degree days. The soil qualities are included because irrigation is a land augmenting technol-
ogy and we expect to see a positive coefﬁcient for poorer quality soils (Lichtenberg 1989). The pump
rate and pump rate per acre are included and expected to have a positive effect on irrigation adoption
(Savage and Brozovi´ c 2009). Depth to water should have a negative coefﬁcient as it would be more
expensive to reach water that was deeper underground. Studies have shown that heat increases crop
yields but extreme heat decreases yields (Schlenker and Roberts 2009). The range of temperatures for
beneﬁcial and extreme heat are discussed in more detail in the data section. Precipitation and bene-
ﬁcial degree days should have a negative coefﬁcient as more precipitation and better growing degree
days increase crop yields without the need for irrigation. However, extreme degree days should have
a positive effect. Housing and structure data are not included as they should not effect the decision to
7irrigate.
In the second step of PSM, the “average treatment effect of treatment on the treated” (ATT) values
are calculated. This is calculated as the difference between the variables of interest in the treated
versus the non treated group that have the same probability of being treated. The control group of un-
treated variables can be constructed in several ways. Here, we chose nearest neighbor matching that
matches a treated observation to an untreated one based on the closest propensity score estimated.
The results of the ATT provide the difference in the average of the variables between the treated and
control group. PSM controls for the selection into treatment, in this case selection into irrigation,
and allows us to compare how the sales price and other variables differ if endogeneity is accounted
for. The ATT estimates the difference in all variables of interest. Therefore, the results for variables
such as housing data and structural data can also be estimated although they are not included in the
ﬁrst-stage probit.
84 Data
For this analysis we synthesized economic, physical, hydrologic, and climatic data. The dataset
used includes all agricultural parcels in Chase County, Nebraska that sold between 2000 and 2008.
First we will describe data from the Chase County tax assessor’s ofﬁce, and then hydrologic and cli-
matic data. Descriptive statistics for the data are reported in Table 1.
4.1 Tax Assessor’s Data
Chase County is made up of mostly agricultural land. Out of 912 sections in the county (each
one square mile in size), 908 contain some type of agricultural land. The total area of the county is
583,680 acres and the population is 4,381 (http://www.co.chase.ne.us/about.html). Agricultural land
sales in the area remain in farmland; there is currently no suburbanization or development pressure
for agricultural land.
The Chase County tax assessor’s ofﬁce maintains records of all parcels in the county. There are
2257 agricultural parcels. From 2000 to 2008 there were 554 sales of agricultural parcels. The price
range for sales was zero to $4,241,000 with the mean at $146,986. Out of the 554 sales, 190 had sale
prices of zero which likely represent transfers from one family member to another. There were also
16 sales which were under $1,000.
The tax assessor’s data also include information regarding the type of land in each parcel. Agri-
cultural land is divided into three types: irrigated, dryland, and grassland. Given current crop prices,
irrigated land is used mostly used for growing corn as it is the most proﬁtable alternative, and dryland
is used to grow wheat. Grassland is not used to grow crops but as pasture. However, in any year
a farmer has the choice either to irrigate (if he has the right to do so via certiﬁed acres) or to be in
dryland production. Certiﬁed acres are ones that have the right to irrigate. Also, in this region there
are no surface water rights, thus all irrigation uses ground water. The tax assessor’s ofﬁce reports
acreages in each soil class in each parcel. The soil classes range from one to four with soil class one
being the best quality and soil class four the worst. The total acreage of the parcel is the total acreage
found by adding averages for all the soil types. Each parcel of land can contain more than one soil
type and many contain all four.
Housing data are also provided by the tax assessor. These include the square footage of houses on
agricultural parcels along with how old such houses are. There are 287 houses in the complete dataset
of 2257 parcels in the county, with a mean square footage of 1550. The size of houses ranges from
384 to 4000 square feet. The age of these houses ranges from one year to 128 years with a mean age
of 66 years. Other structures reported are outbuildings. There are 407 parcels with outbuildings.
For the purposes of the analysis in this paper, we dropped the 206 observations which had sales
prices of either zero or under $1,000 as these do not appear to be arms length sales. We calculated the
sale price per acre by dividing these by the total acreage. This left 348 sales out of which eight had
sale price per acre values of greater than $6,000 and four had total acreages of less than four. These
12 observations were also dropped from the ﬁnal analysis. Parcels with sale prices per acre above
9$6,000 were dropped as such high prices are inconsistent with agricultural use. One of the parcels
was purchased by an energy company in California and is likely to be for an ethanol plant.3 The price
of another can be attributed to a feedlot on the property. Parcels of less than four acres were dropped
because such small acreages may not represent land whose primary purpose is agricultural produc-
tion. These changes left a total of 330 observations with a mean price per acre of $1178. Descriptive
statistics for these 330 observations are presented in Table 2. Note the clustering of parcels around
160 acres in size, equal to one quarter section of land (Figure 2).
The soil data were summed up across the four different types (soil 1 through soil 4) and divided
by the total acreage to obtain proportions of each type for the analysis. For the parcels that sold, the
average proportions of soil 1 and soil 4 were similar at 31 and 33 percent, respectively. The average
proportion of soil 2 was 15 percent and soil 3 about 20 percent. In addition, a dummy variable for
irrigation was also created. The dummy equaled one if irrigated land was present in the parcel and
zero otherwise. Out of the 330 observations, 163 were included some irrigated land and 167 had no
irrigated land. Figure 3 shows the distribution of irrigated and dryland in the county with the sale
price per acre. Note that the ﬁgure shows more irrigated land in the west of the county. This may be
due in part to a large precipitation gradient across the county with lower precipitation in the west.
There were 34 observations with houses in the ﬁnal data set, with a mean square footage of 1514.
These were divided by the total acreage and the square feet per acre value was used in the estimation.
This follows Xu et al. (1993) and Torell et al. (1990). Butsic (2007) and Parsons (1990) have also
argued that weighting of the variable by parcel size is the right speciﬁcation.4 The mean house size
per acre was about 2 square feet. There were 53 parcels in the ﬁnal dataset with outbuildings.
Year dummies were also constructed to estimated year ﬁxed effects. The year dummies were equal
to one if there was a sale in that year and zero otherwise. Interaction terms between the year dummies
and irrigation dummy were also included. These were equal to one if there was an irrigated sale in
that year and zero otherwise. The number of irrigated and non-irrigated sales in each year are shown
in Figure 4.
4.2 Hydrologic and Climatic Data
Hydrological data included in the model are depth to water and the rate at which a well can
pump water (the pump rate in gallons per minute). Both the depth to water and pump rate data
were obtained from the Nebraska Department of Natural Resources (http://www.dnr.state.ne.us) wells
database (Palazzo 2009). Well-level observations were aggregated up to the section level and spatial
interpolation was used to estimate values at section centroids for all parcels, whether irrigated or not
as these values do not exist for non-irrigated parcels (Savage and Brozovi´ c 2009). The depth to water
measures the distance in feet from the land surface to the top of the aquifer. Figure 5 shows the distri-
bution of depths in the county. The shallowest depths, that is water that is more easily reachable, are
3The parcel ID for this purchase is 150002513 and it sold in December 2007.
4To test if this speciﬁcation was accurate, the model was also tested using a housing dummy; the sign and signiﬁcance
of the coefﬁcients remained unchanged.
10found in the west. Depth to water ranges from about 3 feet to 390 feet with a mean of 143 feet, for
the parcels that sold.
The pump rate is measured in gallons per minute. The rate is an inherent characteristic of the land
and does not depend on the equipment used. Figure 6 shows the distribution of pump rates and pump
rates per acre. Values were calculated at the section level as described above. The mean pump rate
is 1643 gallons per minute and the mean pump rate per acre 18 gallons per minute. Note that there
appears to be less spatial correlation in pump rates than in depth to water (compare ﬁgures 5 and 6).
Interaction terms between pump rate and pump rate per acre and the irrigation dummy were also
constructed. These variables were included to capture incremental value of pump rate speciﬁcally on
irrigated land. Similarly, an interaction term between depth to water and the irrigation dummy was
constructed.
Precipitation and minimum and maximum temperature data obtained from the National Weather
Service are included (http://cdo.ncdc.noaa.gov). The precipitation data collected were annualized
from total monthly precipitation (Savage and Brozovi´ c 2009). The temperature data were used to
calculate beneﬁcial and harmful growing conditions. Schlenker and Roberts (2009) found that crop
production is non linear in heat: heat is beneﬁcial up to a certain point but then it is harmful at higher
levels. Schlenker and Roberts estimated that beneﬁcial heat ranges from 8 to 29 degrees Celsius and
harmful heat is anything greater than 29 degrees Celsius. Both beneﬁcial and harmful degree days
are calculated as lagged three year averages over the growing season, which is from March to August
(Savage and Brozovi´ c 2009).
115 Results
In this section we analyze and discuss the results of both the Ordinary Least Squares model and
its variations and the Propensity Score Matching model.
5.1 Ordinary Least Squares Regression Results
To help with interpretation of results, we present several different models. The simplest model
uses Ordinary Least Squares to measure the hedonic value of irrigation (Table 3). Three variations of
the model are presented. The ﬁrst model does not have year ﬁxed effects, the second includes year
dummies and the third includes year dummies as well as interaction terms between the year dummies
and the irrigation dummy. Each of the variations of the model is discussed below.5
In general, OLS results follow expected coefﬁcients (Table 3). The coefﬁcient for the irrigation
dummy in the ﬁrst model is 712 and is statistically signiﬁcant at the one percent level. This means
that an irrigated parcel of land has a sale price that is $712 per acre of the parcel more than that of
a non-irrigated parcel, holding everything else constant. This is the implicit price of groundwater in
irrigation. The mean sale price for a parcel of land is $1178. The value of irrigated land at $712
dollars is about 60 percent more than non-irrigated land at the mean price. This result is comparable
with that found by Faux and Perry (1999) but is higher than values found by Petrie and Taylor (2007)
at 30 percent. The pump rate is positive and signiﬁcant at the ﬁve percent level. The coefﬁcient of
0.18 implies that a one gallon per minute increase in the pumping rate would cause the sale price of
land to increase by 18 cents per acre. The house size per acre had a coefﬁcient of 33 and was statis-
tically signiﬁcant at the one percent level. This indicates that an increase of one square foot per acre
would increase the sale price by $33. The dummy for outbuildings is statistically different from zero
at the ﬁve percent level and is a positive coefﬁcient of 307, implying that if there is an outbuilding
on the parcel the sale price per acre of land would increase by $307. As hypothesized in the model
section, depth to water is expected to have a negative coefﬁcient because deeper water is associated
with higher variable pumping costs. However, my results ﬁnd no signiﬁcant effect of depth on the
sale price. Climatic variables also do not have an impact on the sale price.
The data on sales are from 2000 to 2008, which includes the boom in corn ethanol production.
For this reason we might expect to see higher land prices in more recent years. To test if such a time
trend exists the second model includes year dummies (Tables 3 and 4). For this model, the value of
irrigation is $723 per acre. It is statistically signiﬁcant at the one percent level. Similar to the ﬁrst
model, the pump rate is statistically signiﬁcant at the ﬁve percent level and a one gallon per minute
increase cause the sale price to increase by 18 cents per acre. An increase in the house size also causes
the sale price to go up by $34. The dummy for outbuildings is statistically signiﬁcantly positive at the
ﬁve percent level. If a parcel has an outbuilding the sale price per acre increases by $300. None of the
year dummies are statistically different from zero, suggesting that there is no strong time trend in sale
price per acre of land (Table 4). However, some of the year dummies are statistically different from
each other. Years 2001, 2002, 2003, and 2005 are different from 2007 and 2008 at the ﬁve percent
5The results presented are for the dataset which includes 330 sales where total agricultural acreage is greater than four
and the sale price per acre is less than $6,000. Different cutoff values were tested to check the robustness of the model.
12level. Year 2001 is different from 2004 at the ten percent signiﬁcance level.6 One reason why no
signiﬁcant trend is observed may be the relatively low number of sales per year.
The ethanol boom caused prices for crops to increase overall. However, relative to other crops,
corn prices increased the most. In Chase County, where corn is grown on irrigated land, we might thus
expect to see a more pronounced time trend in the sale price of irrigate land. Model three includes
both year dummies and year dummies interacted with the irrigation dummy to test for this. The re-
sults are reported in Tables 3 and 4. The irrigation dummy is dropped from the model to enable direct
interpretation of the year irrigation dummy interaction terms. The sign, magnitude and signiﬁcance of
most coefﬁcients is unchanged from the previous model. Again, the year dummies are not statistically
different from zero, indicating no trend in the sale price of all land. As there was a boom in ethanol
and corn prices leading up to 2007, we would expect to see a trend as corn dominates the irrigated
agriculture in the area. Each year is also not statistically different from the others. The year dummies
interacted with the irrigation dummy allow for the estimation of the value of irrigation in each of the
eight years represented by the model. The interaction terms are signiﬁcantly different from zero from
2003 to 2008. In 2003, the sale price of irrigated land was $716 more than that of non-irrigated land
(signiﬁcant at the ﬁve percent level). The range in the difference of the sale price per acre in each year
is from $514 in 2005 to $1,051 in 2007. In addition, each of the interaction terms are not signiﬁcantly
different from each other except for 2002 and 2005 compared to 2007. Thus, overall, there is some
weak evidence that sale prices of irrigated land were higher in the last few years.
The OLS model was also estimated with the pump rate, pump rate per acre, and depth to water
interacted with the irrigation dummy. These variables were included as we would expect these vari-
ables to matter on land that was being irrigated and not necessarily on land which was not, given the
moratorium on new wells. These results are reported in Tables 5 and 6. This model was also run
with the year dummies and with year dummy and irrigation dummy interaction terms. Most previous
models of groundwater do not include the pump rate. However, Palazzo (2009) found that the pump
rate is an important factor in determining per acre returns to irrigation in the Republican River basin.
In all models the interaction term between pump rate per acre and the irrigation dummy is signiﬁ-
cant. This implies that a higher pump rate per acre increases the sales price of irrigated land only. For
non-irrigated land, pump rate per acre is not signiﬁcant. The signiﬁcance of the pump rate interaction
term is consistent with the results of Petrie and Taylor (2007), as following a moratorium on new
wells, we would expect no additional value on non-irrigated parcels from variables associated with
groundwater availability.
For models with irrigation interaction terms, the value of irrigation must be calculated as it is no
longer the coefﬁcient on the irrigation dummy. The value of irrigation can be calculated by adding
the value of the irrigation dummy coefﬁcient to the pump rate per acre irrigation interaction term
multiplied by the mean pump rate for irrigated land and then subtracting the pump rate multiplied by
the mean value of pump rate on irrigated land and the depth to water irrigation interaction term mul-
tiplied by the mean depth to water on irrigated land. For the ﬁrst model, without year dummies, the
6The models were also estimated using a time trend and a shift variable. The time trend was found to be signiﬁcant
and also the shift variable which was equal to one after 2006 and zero before. Other coefﬁcients remained the same.
13value of irrigation is calculated to be $729 and for the second model it is $747. In all the models, the
pump rate per acre irrigation dummy interaction term and house size per acre are statistically different
from zero. An increase in the pump rate of one gallon per minute per acre increases the sale price of
irrigated land by $24.
In the third model, the irrigation dummy is removed from the estimation and the value of irrigation
is estimated for each year. we test the joint signiﬁcance of the year irrigation dummy interaction term
with the irrigated depth to water, irrigated pump rate, and irrigated pump rate per acre dummies. we
ﬁnd the dummies to be jointly signiﬁcantly different from zero starting in 2003. The range of values
of irrigation were from $563 in 2005 per acre to $1083 per acre in 2007. Once again, this provides
some evidence that sale prices of irrigated land have been increasing over time.
5.2 Propensity Score Matching Results
In addition to Ordinary Least Squares, we used propensity score matching (PSM) to estimate the
value of irrigation water. The decision to irrigate a parcel of land is not random but is based on the
characteristics of that parcel. Thus, the endogeneity in the choice of whether to irrigate or not may
result in biased OLS estimates. PSM is able to tackle this problem by matching each irrigated parcel
to non-irrigated parcels with equivalent propensity scores.
The ﬁrst step of PSM involves running a probit regression where the dependent variable is a binary
variable (treatment variable). For my model, the treatment is irrigation and the dependent variable is
equal to one if the parcel is irrigated and zero if non-irrigated. Independent variables included in the
PSM model were soil 2, soil 3, soil 4, pump rate, pump rate per acre, depth to water, precipitation,
beneﬁcial degree days, and harmful degree days. The housing and structural data are not included in
this model as they are not expected to affect the decision to irrigate a parcel of land.
Marginal effects of the probit regression are reported in Table 7. These are useful in describing
how each independent variable effects adoption into irrigation. The marginal effect of soil 3 is 0.691.
All else equal, a parcel that consists of soil 3 only is 69.1 percent more likely to be irrigated then one
that consists of soil 1 only. As the soil types are estimated as proportions and soil 1 is dropped from
the model, these results on soil 3 and soil 4 are relative to soil 1. This implies that irrigation is more
likely to be implemented on intermediate quality soil, so it is a land-quality augmenting technology
(Lichtenberg 1989). However, unlike the results of Lichtenberg (1989), my results suggest that irriga-
tion is least likely on the poorest quality soils, implying that there are limits on the productivity goal
of irrigation.
The marginal effect of pump rate is positive at 0.0002. This means that at the average pump rate
and increase in one gallon per minute would result in an increase in the probability of irrigation by
0.0002. The effect of pump rate per acre is -0.012. This negative coefﬁcient is not what we would
expect. One possibility is that there are errors in estimating the pump rates for parcels that are wholly
non-irrigated. The beneﬁcial degree days variable has a marginal effect of -0.031. This means that
if growing degree days increase by one day at the average level, the probability of irrigation will
decrease by 0.0267. The harmful degree days variable has a positive marginal effect of 0.031. This
14means that an increase in harmful degree days, which is extreme heat, will increase the probability of
adoption into irrigation by 0.5195.
Depth to water and climatic variables are signiﬁcant in the probit results, which is different from
what we found using OLS. Overall these results suggest that depth to water is important in the de-
cision to irrigate, but once that decision has been made, depth to water no longer matters in land
value. Some support for this argument is given by Palazzo (2009), who found that high well pump
rates were a more important factor in per acre proﬁts than low depth to water. Note that even though
Chase County is relatively small, there is a large rainfall gradient, and this may help to explain the
signiﬁcance of the climatic variables.
A hit or miss table of the probit results shows that the probit model has a good ﬁt (Table 8). The
dataset has 163 irrigated parcels of land and 167 non-irrigated parcels. To measure the goodness of
ﬁt, the irrigated parcels would be considered non irrigated as there are more non-irrigated parcels.
Thus, the ﬁt would be about 50 percent. The probit model predicts 128 of the non-irrigated parcels
and 105 of the irrigated parcels correctly. This means that the goodness of ﬁt is 70 percent, which is
higher than what would have been estimated without the probit model.
The average treatment effects results are reported in Table 9. The coefﬁcient on sale price per
acre is positive and highly signiﬁcant for the unmatched as well as the matched results. However,
the unmatched results estimate a difference of $721 between irrigated and non-irrigated land while
the difference in the matched results is higher at $839. Thus, with PSM, the value of irrigation is
estimated to be higher than that found with the OLS regression. Soil 3, soil 4, pump rate, house size,
value of outbuildings, house age, depth to water, and precipitation were signiﬁcantly different from
zero for the unmatched data but these differences disappear when they are matched.
The values of irrigated land estimated above measure the price per acre of an irrigated parcel.
However, in order to calculate the price of a fully irrigated acre, these estimated must be divided by
the proportion of the parcel on average that is irrigated. Only 83 percent of irrigated land is irrigated
on average and thus all results must be divided by 0.83 to obtain the value of a fully irrigated acre.
My results show that irrigation is being adopted more on intermediate quality soil and not on
the highest or lowest quality. As irrigation is a land-quality augmenting technology, the proﬁts from
adopting irrigation on the intermediate quality soil is the greatest (Lichtenberg 1989). This may ex-
plain the higher value of irrigation that are estimated using the PSM methodology.
156 Conclusion and Policy Implications
Growing environmental concerns regarding depletion of groundwater resources along with in-
terstate conﬂicts have led to increased restrictions in agricultural water use. In order for the water
management regulations to be cost-effective, the value of water must be estimated correctly. In this
paper, we compare a standard hedonic model and a propensity score matching model to estimate the
value of groundwater in an area where groundwater use is permitted and there is a moratorium on
new wells. We use propensity score matching in order to account for selection issues in the hedonic
method, as an irrigated parcel is by deﬁnition different from a non-irrigated one and this may cause
bias in the results from the ﬁrst model. Our data are from Chase County, Nebraska and consist of tax
assessor’s data, physical, hydrologic, and climatic variables related to 330 sales of agricultural land
between 2000 and 2008. We compare the results of the two models and ﬁnd that irrigation does have
a signiﬁcant and positive effect on land prices. However, the propensity score matching methodology
gives estimates of the value of water over 15 percent higher than those estimated using standard he-
donic analysis.
We ﬁnd that the value of water estimated using Ordinary Least Squares ranges from $712 to $723
per acre, depending on the exact speciﬁcation used. The pump rate is an important determinant of
the value of sale price using both OLS and PSM. Conversely, depth to water and climate are only
important in the decision to irrigate, but variations are not capitalized into land value. There is weak
evidence to suggest that prices of land were higher in the last few years than in earlier years for the
period analyzed. The time trend may not be visible due to the small number of sales in each year.
Using a ﬁve percent discount rate along with the allocation of 13 inches per acre per year in the
Upper Republican NRD (Nebraska Department of Natural Resources and Upper Republican Natural
Resource District 2008) gives an annual value of about $34 per acre foot of water. For the propensity
score matching, the value is $40 per acre foot of water per year.7 Note that only 83 percent of irrigated
land is irrigated on average. In order to calculate the value of a fully irrigated acre, the annual value
calculated above is divided by 0.83. Therefore, the estimated value of an acre foot of water per year
in Chase County is $41 using OLS and $48 using PSM. These values are lower than those found by
Palazzo (2009) in the same area but this may be because of the high commodity prices used in that
analysis.
The higher value of irrigation that results from the PSM estimation may be because irrigation
adoption is taking place preferentially on intermediate quality soil and not the best quality soil. This
is because irrigation is a land-quality augmenting technology, so that the highest proﬁt difference
between irrigated and dryland agriculture is not on the highest quality soil (Lichtenberg 1989). Irriga-
tion is expected to be land-quality augmenting in general and thus the result that OLS may bias values
of irrigation downwards is not limited to just Chase County. Standard hedonic methods that do not
account for selection issues may be biased in other areas as well.
Future work could include analyzing the value of water for other counties in the region to verify
the results obtained here. Most groundwater models use depth to water as an important determinant
of irrigated production and technology and do not consider well yield at all. Similarly, PSM is only
7a = rC=1+r where r=annual interest rate, C=capitalized value, and a=annual value
16one method to correct for selection issues. The Heckman selection model could also be used and the
results compared to those obtained here. My results suggest that pump rate is the more important
variable in determining proﬁts and may need to be modeled explicitly.
The results of this paper have important policy implications in areas such as Nebraska where there
is debate on how to reduce water use cost-effectively. The analyses presented here suggest that future
reductions may be costlier than previous research suggests, and that the standard hedonic method
may not be best in estimating the value of water. In particular, if policy analyses use a standard hedo-
nic methodology, the reductions will be more expensive than anticipated to both the government and
farmers. In Nebraska, the government has tried to reduce water use by buying permits from farmers.
There has been a lot of resistance to this and one explanation for this may be that the government is
not offering enough compensation for the permits.


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































19Table 2: Descriptive Statistics: Parcels that Sold, Chase County 2000-2008
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Sale Price (per acre) 1178.293 952.183 63.291 5031.25
Irrigation Dummy 0.494 0.501 0 1
Soil 1 Irrigated 0.117 0.255 0 1
Soil 2 Irrigated 0.067 0.164 0 0.886
Soil 3 Irrigated 0.139 0.243 0 1
Soil 4 Irrigated 0.088 0.206 0 0.895
Soil 1 Dryland 0.192 0.345 0 1
Soil 2 Dryland 0.056 0.157 0 1
Soil 3 Dryland 0.052 0.125 0 0.949
Soil 4 Dryland 0.035 0.107 0 0.783
Soil 1 Grassland 0.005 0.022 0 0.189
Soil 2 Grassland 0.024 0.094 0 0.828
Soil 3 Grassland 0.017 0.065 0 0.784
Soil 4 Grassland 0.209 0.351 0 1
Soil 1 0.314 0.391 0 1
Soil 2 0.146 0.245 0 1
Soil 3 0.207 0.279 0 1
Soil 4 0.332 0.383 0 1
Pump Rate (gallons per minute) 1642.598 681.559 297.715 3205.91
Pump Rate (gallons per minute per acre) 17.908 51.629 1.133 658.518
House Size (sq. feet per acre) 1.926 10.267 0 129.335
House Age (years) 7.23 23.784 0 118
Assessed Value of Outbuildings ($ per acre) 41.475 239.077 0 3057.318
Depth to Water (feet) 143.063 86.254 2.988 389.86
Precipitation (inches) 200.877 12.759 138.73 207.947
Beneﬁcial Degree Days 3492.019 46.24 3005.693 3496.441
Harmful Degree Days 72.162 2.435 44.697 72.394
Acres 192.719 131.222 4.600 651.04
Notes: There are four land classes. Soil 1 is the best quality and Soil 4 the worst. The soil data are presented as proportions
of the total acreages in agricultural use in the parcel.
20Table 3: Ordinary Least Squares, n=330
(1) (2) (3)
Variables Model Model Model
Irrigation Dummy 712.41*** 723.34***
(104.452) (104.662)
Soil 2 -92.15 8.94 -28.70
(218.781) (218.544) (224.104)
Soil 3 142.04 120.96 59.87
(211.612) (210.372) (218.511)
Soil 4 163.15 224.75 217.59
(150.029) (149.232) (152.569)
Pump Rate (gallons per minute) 0.18** 0.18** 0.18**
(0.071) (0.071) (0.072)
Pump Rate (gallons per minute per acre) -0.76 -0.65 -0.78
(0.938) (0.938) (0.953)
Depth to Water (feet) -0.27 0.04 0.01
(0.712) (0.717) (0.721)
House Size (sq. feet per acre) 33.32*** 33.69*** 33.68***
(5.141) (5.141) (5.198)
House Age (years) -5.49** -5.40** -5.78**
(2.369) (2.365) (2.409)
Outbuildings Dummy 307.36** 299.95** 295.87**
(145.419) (145.250) (147.875)
Precipitation 1.20 0.89 1.54
(4.293) (4.300) (4.403)
Beneﬁcial Degree Days 1.41 -2.78 -5.77
(18.746) (19.020) (19.281)




Year Dummies NO YES YES
Year Dummy and Irrigation Interaction Terms NO NO YES
Standard errors in parentheses
*10% signiﬁcance; ** 5% signiﬁcance; *** 1% signiﬁcance.
Notes: The dependent variable is sales price per acre.
21Table 4: Ordinary Least Squares continued
(2) (3)
Variables Model Model
Year Dummy 2000 5,796.18 12,289.96
(40,456.289) (40,987.382)
Year Dummy 2001 5,478.53 11,796.29
(40,417.675) (40,961.927)
Year Dummy 2002 5,579.86 11,918.79
(40,454.499) (40,990.005)
Year Dummy 2003 5,616.87 11,831.73
(40,455.449) (40,993.049)
Year Dummy 2004 5,868.01 12,008.73
(40,456.396) (40,990.445)
Year Dummy 2005 5,646.47 11,982.34
(40,469.850) (41,026.755)
Year Dummy 2006 5,765.50 11,923.38
(40,454.944) (40,990.070)
Year Dummy 2007 6,008.51 12,058.77
(40,455.095) (40,991.136)
Year Dummy 2008 6,105.69 12,267.30
(40,455.897) (40,994.504)
Year Dummy 2000*Irrigation Dummy 341.45
(476.352)
Year Dummy 2001*Irrigation Dummy 419.45
(365.632)
Year Dummy 2002*Irrigation Dummy 358.05
(316.081)
Year Dummy 2003*Irrigation Dummy 715.60**
(277.329)
Year Dummy 2004*Irrigation Dummy 841.69***
(228.944)
Year Dummy 2005*Irrigation Dummy 514.30*
(261.954)
Year Dummy 2006*Irrigation Dummy 848.68***
(266.129)
Year Dummy 2007*Irrigation Dummy 1,051.21***
(230.349)
Year Dummy 2008*Irrigation Dummy 844.34**
(328.645)
Standard errors in parentheses
*10% signiﬁcance; ** 5% signiﬁcance; *** 1% signiﬁcance.
Notes: The dependent variable is sales price per acre.
22Table 5: Ordinary Least Squares with Pump Rate and Depth to Water Dummies, n=330
(4) (5) (6)
Variables Model Model Model
Irrigation Dummy 486.07 555.61*
(311.534) (309.487)
Soil 2 -47.08 40.98 -5.04
(219.221) (218.805) (224.490)
Soil 3 183.85 151.59 91.93
(212.080) (210.871) (218.852)
Soil 4 208.61 260.55* 249.98
(150.655) (149.805) (153.054)
Pump Rate (gallons per minute) 0.11 0.13 0.12
(0.105) (0.104) (0.105)
Pump Rate*Irrigation Dummy -0.01 -0.04 -0.03
(0.155) (0.154) (0.156)
Pump Rate (gallons per minute per acre) -0.79 -0.73 -0.85
(0.951) (0.953) (0.966)
Pump Rate (per acre)*Irrigation Dummy 24.41** 24.22** 23.53**
(10.087) (10.103) (10.227)
Depth to Water (feet) 0.04 0.28 0.16
(0.815) (0.819) (0.825)
Depth to Water*Irrigation Dummy -0.07 -0.03 0.25
(1.178) (1.169) (1.196)
House Size (sq. feet per acre) 32.68*** 33.26*** 33.22***
(5.136) (5.137) (5.199)
House Age(years) -5.37** -5.31** -5.60**
(2.357) (2.355) (2.401)
Outbuildings Dummy 327.39** 321.28** 308.93**
(145.113) (145.073) (147.691)
Precipitation 1.66 1.11 1.93
(4.339) (4.353) (4.461)
Beneﬁcial Degree Days 0.80 -3.22 -5.30
(18.721) (18.975) (19.253)




Year Dummies NO YES YES
Year Dummy and Irrigation Interaction Terms NO NO YES
Standard errors in parentheses
*10% signiﬁcance; ** 5% signiﬁcance; *** 1% signiﬁcance.
Notes: The dependent variable is sales price per acre.
23Table 6: Ordinary Least Squares with Pump Rates and Depth to Water continued
(5) (6)
Year Dummy 2000 6,639.79 11,174.96
(40,357.313) (40,925.350)
Year Dummy 2001 6,310.81 10,693.75
(40,320.044) (40,898.464)
Year Dummy 2002 6,400.53 10,822.37
(40,355.691) (40,925.282)
Year Dummy 2003 6,443.21 10,742.00
(40,356.793) (40,928.396)
Year Dummy 2004 6,653.91 10,905.61
(40,357.787) (40,927.229)
Year Dummy 2005 6,482.46 10,874.31
(40,370.353) (40,962.788)
Year Dummy 2006 6,576.42 10,815.12
(40,356.357) (40,926.595)
Year Dummy 2007 6,835.72 10,952.00
(40,356.381) (40,928.163)
Year Dummy 2008 6,924.90 11,164.40
(40,356.921) (40,931.039)
Year Dummy 2000*Irrigation Dummy 160.40
(555.604)
Year Dummy 2001*Irrigation Dummy 222.86
(471.543)
Year Dummy 2002*Irrigation Dummy 115.53
(461.896)
Year Dummy 2003*Irrigation Dummy 473.75
(425.235)
Year Dummy 2004*Irrigation Dummy 558.41
(376.330)
Year Dummy 2005*Irrigation Dummy 325.96
(381.690)
Year Dummy 2006*Irrigation Dummy 614.61
(391.256)
Year Dummy 2007*Irrigation Dummy 845.95**
(365.670)
Year Dummy 2008*Irrigation Dummy 612.24
(440.711)
Standard errors in parentheses
*10% signiﬁcance; ** 5% signiﬁcance; *** 1% signiﬁcance.
Notes: The dependent variable is sales price per acre.
24Table 7: Probit Regression Results, Marginal Effects, n=330
Variables Coefﬁcient Std. Error
Soil 2 0.097 (0.139)
Soil 3 0.691*** (0.144)
Soil 4 -0.182* (0.099)
Pump Rate (gallons per minute) 2E-04*** (0.000)
Pump Rate (gallons per minute per acre) -0.012*** (0.004)
Depth to Water (feet) -0.001** (0.000)
Precipitation -2E-04 (0.003)
Beneﬁcial Degree Days -0.031*** (0.001)
Harmful Degree Days 0.595*** (0.026)
Standard errors in parentheses
*10% signiﬁcance; ** 5% signiﬁcance; *** 1% signiﬁcance.
Table 8: Goodness of ﬁt of probit model
Predicted
Non-Irrigated Irrigated
Actual Non-Irrigated 128 39 167
Irrigated 58 105 163
186 144
25Table 9: Average Effect of Treatment on the Treated, n=330
Variable Sample Treated Controls Difference Std. Error.
Sale Price (per acre) Unmatched 1543.392 821.938 721.454*** 97.149
ATT 1543.392 703.977 839.414** 115.671
Soil 2 Unmatched 0.162 0.131 0.031 0.027
ATT 0.162 0.153 0.009 0.057
Soil 3 Unmatched 0.325 0.093 0.233*** 0.028
ATT 0.325 0.347 -0.021 0.053
Soil 4 Unmatched 0.242 0.420 -0.178*** 0.041
ATT 0.242 0.277 -0.035 0.079
Pump Rate (gallons per minute) Unmatched 1777.863 1510.572 267.291*** 73.694
ATT 1777.863 1783.349 -5.486 134.459
Pump Rate Unmatched 11.031 24.620 -13.588** 5.644
(gallons per minute per acre) ATT 11.031 11.864 -0.833 1.573
Depth to Water (feet) Unmatched 123.276 162.375 -39.099*** 9.263
ATT 123.276 123.436 -0.160 16.935
House Size (sq. feet per acre) Unmatched 0.543 3.275 -2.733** 1.122
ATT 0.543 0.700 -0.158 0.646
House Age Unmatched 5.000 9.407 -4.407 2.611
ATT 5.000 8.883 -3.883 5.799
Outbuildings Dummy Unmatched .160 .162 -.002 .041
ATT .160 .086 .074 .075
Precipitation Unmatched 203.022 198.783 4.240*** 1.387
ATT 203.022 202.851 0.171 2.579
Beneﬁcial Degree Days Unmatched 3493.470 3490.602 2.867 5.097
ATT 3493.470 3496.441 -2.971 2.971
Harmful Degree Days Unmatched 72.244 72.082 0.162 0.268
ATT 72.244 72.394 -0.150 0.150




























































































































































































































































































































27Figure 2: Irrigated and Non-Irrigated Sales
Notes: This is a scatter plot of the sale price per acre and total acreage. Non-irrigated parcels are represented by the darker













































































































































































































































































































29Figure 4: Distribution of Irrigated and Non-Irrigated Sales by Year
Notes: This ﬁgure shows the distribution of irrigated and non-irrigated sales in each year. The lighter bars represent




















































































































































































































































































31Figure 6: Pump Rate
Notes: The ﬁgure on top panel shows the pump rate in gallons per minute. Blue colored squares represent faster pump
rates that allow users to access water more quickly and red colors represent lower pump rates. The bottom panel shows
the pump rate per acre in gallons per minute per acre. Again, blue colored squares represent faster rates.
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